In WDM networks, it is important to protect connections against link failures due to the high bandwidth provided by a fiber link. Although many p-cycle based schemes have been proposed for single-link failure protection, protection against two-link failures have not received much attention. In this paper, we propose p-cycle based protection schemes for two-link failures. We formulate an ILP model for the pcycle design problem for static traffic. We also propose two protection schemes for dynamic traffic, namely SPPP (Shortest Path Pair Protection) and SFPP (Short Full Path Protection). Simulation results show that SFPP is more capacity efficient than SPPP under incremental traffic. Under dynamic traffic, SPPP has lower blocking than SFPP when the traffic load is low and has higher blocking than SFPP when the traffic load is high.
Introduction
Network survivability is an important requirement for WDM optical networks due to their ultra-high capacity. Various protection schemes have been developed for WDM networks. Ring-based protection schemes enable traffic recovery to be completed in 50-60 ms, but require at least 100% capacity redundancy. On the other hand, mesh-based protection schemes are much more capacity efficient, attributed to diverse traffic routing and protection capacity sharing among different connections. However, more complicated protection switching process leads to much longer recovery time. p-Cycle is a promising protection technique as it achieves the speed of ring with the efficiency of mesh [1] , [2] . p-Cycles are established by configuring the spare capacity into pre-cross-connected cycles. Upon a link failure, protection switching is performed at the two endnodes of the failed link and other switching nodes will not be reconfigured. Therefore, traffic recovery is extremely fast. p-Cycle is also efficienct in protection since it protects both on-cycle links and straddling links. As shown in Fig. 1, a- The concept of p-cycle was first proposed in [3] and subsequently many works in literature study the p-cycle design problem for protecting against single-link failures. Most of these works assume the demands have been routed and seek to find the optimal set of p-cycles to protect the given working capacity [3] , [4] , [5] . The joint optimization of the working path routes and the p-cycles is studied in [6] . An extension of the basic p-cycle concept called Failure Independent PathProtecting (FIPP) p-cycle is proposed in [7] , which leads to more capacity efficient network designs than link protecting p-cycle. Recently, the author of [8] introduced a new 1 + N protection scheme against single-link failures by combining network coding and p-cycles.
Although single-link failures are the most common failure scenarios, doublelink failure can occur in some cases. First, after a link fails, a second link may fail while the first link is being repaired. Second, two fiber links may be physically routed together for some distance and a backhoe accident may lead to the failures of both links [9] . Third, if an optical switch with two links connected to it fails, then both links fail. Double-link failure protection has been addressed in some works. In [10] , a p-cycle based scheme for double-link failure protection is proposed where p-cycles are reconfigured based on the remaining spare capacity after a link failure occurs and the corresponding working paths are rerouted. This scheme cannot deal with simultaneous two-link failures. In the scheme proposed in [9] , two linkdisjoint backup paths are computed for each link so that the network is two-link failure survivable. The similar scheme was also proposed in [11] and the problem was formulated as an Integer Linear Program. The scheme is slow in recovery because the backup paths are configured after link failure occurs. In [12] , a pcycle based multi-QoP (quality of protection) framework with five QoP service classes is proposed, where the platinum class is assured protection from all two-link failures. The protection for a platinum demand is achieved by routing it entirely over straddling links. There are also some work addressing multiple-link failure protection. The authors of [13] proposed algorithms to find k disjoint p-cycles to protect each link such that the network is k link-failure survivable. The author of [14] extended his work in [8] to protect multiple-link failures by using network coding and p-cycles.
In this paper, we consider the problem of protecting connections against two simultaneous link failures. Our basic idea is to use two p-cycles with link-disjoint protection segments to protect each working link. Since p-cycles are preconfigured using the spare capacity in the network, extremely fast recovery can be achieved. We formulate an ILP model for the p-cycle design problem for static traffic model in which the set of connections to be established is given a priori. We propose two protection schemes for dynamic traffic. In the dynamic traffic model, connection requests arrive at the network one by one and the network knows nothing about the bandwidth requirement, source and destination node of incoming requests. Thus, primary and backup lightpaths need to be computed online according to the utilization of the current network resources. We also study the performance in incremental traffic which is a special case of dynamic traffic and the demand never terminates once it is satisfied.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present two theorems about double-link failure protection. An ILP model for the p-cycle design problem for static traffic is given in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose two doublelink failure protection schemes for dynamic traffic. Numerical results are presented in Section 5 and conclusions are given in Section 6.
Preliminaries
We use a directed graph G = (V, E) to represent a WDM optical network. A bidirectional communication link between nodes u and v are represented by two directed edges u v ∈ E and v u ∈ E. Connections are unidirectional and each connection requires one unit of capacity (i.e., the capacity of a wavelength). We use unidirectional p-cycles to protect connections. A unidirectional p-cycle consumes one unit of capacity on each unidirectional on-cycle link; it can protect one unit of working capacity on any straddling link and any link in the opposite direction of an on-cycle link. In [13] , two link-disjoint p-cycles are computed to protect a working link against two link failures. However, we do not have to enforce the link-disjoint requirement on the two p-cycles in order to protect a link against two link failures. In fact, when a link e is protected by a p-cycle pc, only part of the p-cycle is used for protection. We name the part of pc that carries the traffic when e fails as the protection segment for e on pc, which is denoted by pc(e). Fig. 2 shows two p-cycles pc 1 The following theorem gives the sufficient condition for the traffic on a working link to be protected against any two-link failure. Proof The three conditions ensure that there are three link-disjoint paths from A to B: one is the direct link from A to B, the other two are pc 1 (A B) and pc 2 (A B). When any two links in the network fail, there must exist at least one path from A to B that is intact. Therefore, link A B is protected against any two-link failure.
According to Theorem 1, we can use two protection-segment-disjoint p-cycles to protect a working link against two link failures. However, using two p-cycles to protect each working link requires a large amount of protection capacity. To reduce the capacity requirement, we allow two working links to share the protection of a common p-cycle. Let e 1 and e 2 be two working links. Let S 1 and S 2 be a pair of protection-segment-disjoint p-cycles for e 1 and e 2 , respectively. If |S 1 ∩ S 2 | = 1, then e 1 and e 2 share one p-cycle. If |S 1 ∩ S 2 | = 2, then e 1 and e 2 are protected by the same pair of p-cycles. When two links share one or two p-cycles, it is possible that the failure of these two links will leave one or both of them unprotected. In this case, we say the sharing is invalid. On the other hand, we say the sharing is valid if the two links are still protected when both of them fail simultaneously. In the following, we present a theorem that gives the sufficient condition for a valid sharing. Proof Upon a two-link failure, we consider the case that only one of e 1 and e 2 fails, say e 1 , so e 2 is still working and only e 1 needs to be protected. Based on Theorem 1, there must still exist one protection segment for e 1 that is not affected by another link failure, since e 1 is protected by two link-disjoint segments. Thus, both e 1 and e 2 can survive regardless of protection sharing.
Thus, we only need to focus on the case where both e 1 and e 2 fail. Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that both pc 1 (e 1 ) and pc 2 (e 2 ) are not affected by the failures. If pc 1 = pc 2 , then e 1 and e 2 are protected by pc 1 and pc 2 , respectively. In this case, the sharing is valid. If pc 1 = pc 2 , then pc 1 (e 1 ) has to be link-disjoint with pc 1 (e 2 ) described in condition 3. Otherwise, one unit protection capacity provided by a pcycle is not enough to protect two failed link at a time. Thus, pc 1 (e 1 ) and pc 1 (e 2 ) have to be link-disjoint to validate the sharing. 2 . We now consider the example shown in Fig. 3(b) , where everything is the same except that the direction of p-cycle pc 1 is reversed. In this case, pc 1 (e 1 ) = (A E B) does not contain e 2 , pc 1 (e 2 ) = (C F D) does not contain e 1 , and pc 1 (e 1 ) and pc 1 (e 2 ) are link-disjoint. According to Theorem 2, e 1 and e 2 can validly share pc 1 and pc 2 .
An ILP Model for Static Traffic Protection
In this section, we present an ILP model for the following p-cycle design problem: given a network G = (V, E), the working capacity d ab on each link (a b)∈E, and the maximum number of p-cycles needed, compute a set of p-cycles to protect the working capacity against two-link failures such that the total capacity required by the p-cycles is minimized.
In the input parameters, P is the upper bound of the number of p-cycles needed and can be computed according to the static demands. Suppose the static demands need M links with one unit of capacity reserved on each link, a total of 2M pcycles will be required in the worst case to protect any 
The objective function sums the total capacity used by all the active p-cycles. 1) Capacity Constraints:
Equation (1) ensures that each working unit on a link should be protected by at least two p-cycles. Equation (2) ensures that a unidirectional p-cycle can protect only one unit capacity on a given link.
2) Cycle Constraints:
Equations (3) is the flow conservation constraint for any simple cycle by ensuring that the in-degree and out-degree of every on-cycle node is 1. Equation (4) ensures that each unidirectional p-cycle p cannot traverse the same link twice in both directions.
3) Link Protection Constraints:
Equation (5) and (6) are the flow conservation constraints for each protection segment provided by a p-cycle p to protect the k th working capacity on link a b. In this case, a unit of protection flow should be reserved from node a to b using the on-cycle links of p. But there is no incoming flow of source node a and outgoing flow of b along the protection segment. Equation (7) ensures that any link (m n) used by a protection segment should be an on-cycle link of the protection p-cycle.
4) Protection Segment Disjointness Constraints:
Any link should be link-disjoint with its protection segment in any direction, which is guaranteed by Equation (8) and (9).
5) Absolute Value Constraints:
, which will be used for protection sharing between link ab k and cd l. The absolute value AB
is defined by equations (11) - (14). Eq. (11) and (12) make sure that the absolute value is always greater and equal to 0. However, they are not enough. When both v variables equal each other, the absolute value should be 0. But it can still be either 0 or 1. In order to make it equal 0, we have to introduce a new binary variable, C p,(ab k) cd l . Eq. (13) and (14) ensure that when both v variables equal 0 or 1 at the same time, the absolute value AB can only be 0 by randomly choosing C as either 0 or 1. Meanwhile, equation (11) and (12) are not violated.
6) p-Cycle Sharing Constraints:
Constraint (15) ensures that all p-cycle sharing are valid based on Theorem 2. It takes the following three cases into the consideration when both link (a b) and (15) ensures that one of the last two cases will occur.
Current objective is to minimize the spare capacity required by the p-cycles. However, this objective could be easily modified to achieve different goals. For instance: 1. If the goal is to minimize the maximum total capacity (working and spare capacity) used on any link, we can introduce a new variable ζ and a new constraint:
In this newly added constraint, ζ is the maximal aggregated amount of capacity reserved by working capacity and protection p-cycles on every link. Accordingly, the new objective will be: Minimize ζ. 2. In the second case, if the total amount of capacity provided by each link (m n) is upper bounded by a number, denoted by λ mn , we can introduce a new constraint: λ mn ≥ d mn + e p mn , ∀(m n) ∈ E to ensure that the total capacity reserved on each link will not exceed the limit. Therefore, our ILP model can be modified in a flexible fashion to adapt to various network scenarios with different design goals.
Protection Schemes for Dynamic Traffic
In this section, we study the problem of two-link failure protection for dynamic traffic. We assume that the working path for a connection is given. The problem is to compute a set of p-cycles to protect the working path against any two-link failure so that the total capacity required by the p-cycles is minimized. We present two heuristic algorithms for this problem. Both algorithms are designed to achieve efficient protection by employing p-cycle sharing. The notations and some functions used in the algorithms are explained in Table 1 . 
Shortest Path Pair Protection Scheme
We propose the Shortest Path Pair Protection (SPPP) scheme in this section. Given the working path P of a connection, SPPP computes a set of p-cycles to protect P as follows. For each link on P, we compute two p-cycles to protect the link so that the two p-cycles are protection-segment-disjoint. Whenever possible, we reuse the p-cycles that have been previously provisioned to minimize the total protection capacity. 
We try to use as many existing p-cycles as possible to maximize the sharing. We first check whether there exist two p-cycles in C(e) such that they can be reused to protect e. If so, no new p-cycle needs to be created for e. This check can be done by using the check share function. If two p-cycles cannot be found in C(e), we try to reuse at least one p-cycle. By checking the protection condition of a p-cycle, say pc i , we need to construct the second p-cycle pc j for e such that pc i (e) and pc j (e) are link-disjoint. If check share(pc i , pc j , e) returns true, then e is protected against double-link failure. Finally, if none of the p-cycles in C can be reused to protect e, then we construct two new p-cycles for e such that the protection segments for e on these two p-cycles are link-disjoint.
The function cycle build(e, n) is used to construct new cycles where n is the number of newly constructed cycles. If n = 1, the function finds the shortest path that is link-disjoint with e using Dijkstra's algorithm and then combines the same link e in the opposite direction to form a cycle, which can be used to protect e. If n = 2, we first use Bhandari's algorithm [15] to obtain a pair of link-disjoint paths between the two end nodes of e with minimum total length by temporarily marking it invalid. We can obtain two p-cycles for e by combining each path with e in the reverse direction. Clearly, these two p-cycles can provide link-disjoint protection segments for e.
The pseudo-code of the SPPP scheme is shown in Algorithm 1. The input is a working path P and the set of the existing p-cycles, the output is a new set C of p-cycles that protect P. The algorithm computes two p-cycles for each link e ∈ P in the for loop from line 1 to line 19. The first step of the procedure is executed by Lines 3-6, in which we try to find a pair of existing p-cycles to protect a given link e. The second step is conducted by Lines 7-12, in which we reuse a p-cycle pc i and construct a new one, pc j to provide protection. The final step is to construct two new p-cycles such that their protection segments are link-disjoint, which is realized by Lines 13-18. It is worth noting that each p-cycle can only protect a link once. Once a link e has been protected by a given p-cycle, say pc i , this p-cycle is valid to protect e any more in the future. This is the reason that in Lines 5 and 9, we need to remove the p-cycles that have been used to protect e from C(e). We now analyze the time complexity of SPPP. First, we check the running time of function check share(pc i , pc j , e) is O(|E||V | 2 ) because it needs to check each working link protected by pc i to see if it can share pc i with e, and the time of the checking process is O(|V | 2 ). For each e ∈ P, the algorithm computes two p-cycles for e. The time of this computation is dominated by the computation in line 3. We assume |C(e)| is upper bounded by a constant. Since line 3 is executed for each edge in the working path P and the number of edges in P is upper bounded by |V |, the complexity of SPPP is O (|E||V | 3 ) .
The advantage of the SPPP scheme is that it can save plenty of protection capacity by exploiting p-cycle sharing. However, SPPP always creates short p-cycles, which are less efficient than long p-cycles as shown in [16] since short p-cycles tend to have less straddling links. In the next, we present another protection scheme that makes use of long p-cycles for connection protection.
Shortest Full Path Protection Scheme
In this section, we present the Shortest Full Path Protection (SFPP) Scheme. Given the working path P of a connection, SFPP computes a set of p-cycles to protect P as follows. First, we compute one short p-cycle for each link on P. Next, we compute a long p-cycle that contains all links on P and is link-disjoint with the protection segments of all the working links computed in the first step. Clearly, the long p-cycle can protect every link in P. Therefore, each working link is still protected by two p-cycles (one short and one long) with link-disjoint protection segments. Like SPPP, SFPP reuses existing p-cycles whenever possible to save protection capacity. 4 , are first found to protect link 1 to link 4. These short p-cycles can be shared by the working links. For example, if link 3 can share pc 1 with link 1, then pc 3 = pc 1 and no new short p-cycle needs to be created for link 3. In the second step, we find a long p-cycle, labeled as pc 5 , to cover the entire working path. pc 5 must be link-disjoint with the protection segments pc 1 (link1) to pc 4 (link4) to ensure that each working link is protected by two protection-segment-disjoint p-cycles.
We now explain the details of SFPP. We first find one short p-cycle for every link e on the working path P. During this process, existing p-cycles will be reused if sharing is possible. Specifically, when we process link e, we first check whether there is a p-cycle in C(e) that can be reused to protect e. A p-cycle pc i can be reused to protect e if 1) pc i does not contain any edge e = e ∈ P, and 2) for every link e = e ∈ P that is protected by pc i , pc i (e) and pc i (e ) are link-disjoint. The first condition is needed because if pc i contains e , then pc and the long p-cycle will not be protection-segment-disjoint since they both contain e . The second condition is needed for the following reason. When both e and e fail, the long pcycle can protect neither of them since the protection segment of one link contains the other link. So, both links have to be protected by pc i . We define a function check disjoint(pc i , e) to check whether those two conditions given a link e and an existing p-cycle pc i . It returns true if both conditions are satisfied.
If the function returns false, a new p-cycle should be constructed for e with the requirement that it does not contain any edge e = e in P. After each link e ∈ P has been protected by a p-cycle, we construct a long p-cycle as follows. We first mark all the links in P as invalid as well as all links on the protection segments (provided by the short p-cycles) of all the working links in P. We can simply substitute e in the function cycle build(e, n) by P and then run cycle build(P, 1) to form a long p-cycle pc f by combining two link-disjoint paths. One, denoted by P , starts from the source s to the destination d and the other one is P in the opposite direction. Hence, each link on the path P is protected against double-link failure.
However, constructing this new long p-cycle may destruct the validity of sharing between any link e ∈ P with any link e / ∈ P if e and e share a short p-cycle. We have to make sure that after the construction of pc f , every link e ∈ P is still protected and every p-cycle sharing is valid. We define a function check share2(e, e , pc i ) to perform the checking process. The function returns true if the sharing of a p-cycle pc i by e and e is valid based on Theorem 2. If the function returns false, we have to reconstruct the long p-cycle pc f because it must contain link e (We will explain why in the next.) We could make the sharing valid if the new p-cycle pc f does not contain e . Hence, we need to temporarily remove e from G before construct the new pc f . After all troublesome links are removed, we recompute a long p-cycle pc f . We then repeat the process of checking p-cycle sharing validity and computing the long p-cycle until no invalid p-cycle sharing can be found.
We now explain why an invalid sharing of pc i by e and e is caused by the inclusion of e in pc f . Let pc f be the second p-cycle that protects e . (The first p-cycle that protects e is pc i , which is shared by e.) In order for e and e to validly share pc i , we have to make sure that when both links fail, at least one of pc i and pc f can protect e and at least one of pc i and pc f can protect e. We know that at least one of the protection segments pc i (e ) and pc f (e ) does not contain e since they must be link-disjoint. Therefore, there are three cases to consider as follows: Add pc f to C and C(e ) for all e ∈ E that can be protected by pc f ;
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As can be seen from the above three cases, if we know e and e cannot validly share pc, then it must be the case that pc f contains e . And we can turn the sharing into a valid one by making sure that pc f does not contain e . The pseudo-code of the SFPP scheme is shown in Algorithm 2. The input is a working path P and the set of existing p-cycles C, the output is the updated set C of p-cycles. Set C temp stores the protection segments that are used to protect the links on P. The first loop from line 1-11 tries to find an existing p-cycle to protect each link e ∈ P. If no existing p-cycle in C can protect a given e, then construct a new p-cycle. We need to make sure that certain capacity sharing conditions have to be satisfied. The second part from line 12-13 is to construct the long p-cycle pc f for the whole path P. However, pc f may cause invalid sharing between any link on P and the links not in P based on our previous analysis if it traverses any link in C temp . Hence, we need to use function check share2 to check the validity of pc f . If the function returns false, we need to temporarily remove the link and reconstruct a new pc f repeatedly until a valid long p-cycle is found. This process is described by line 14-22. After we find a pc f that ensures all p-cycle sharing is valid, we add it into set C and also update C(e ) for each edge e = e that can be protected by pc f in line 23.
The time complexity of SFPP is dominated by the repeated construction process in lines 15-22. The complexity of function check share2(e, e , pc) is O(|V | 2 ), so the complexity of lines 15-18 is O(|V ||E||V | 2 ) = O(|E||V | 3 ). This block of code would be executed at most |E| times because at most |E| edges can be removed from G. Therefore, the complexity of SFPP is O(|E| 2 |V | 3 ).
Since SFPP makes use of long p-cycles, when failures occur in the network, some rerouted working paths may pass through redundant nodes and links since protection switching is done at the two endnodes of the failed link. This problem can be solved using the algorithm given in [17] , which removes the loop backs and release the redundant capacity by reconfiguring the restored paths.
Numerical Results

Metrics and Methodology
We use ILOG CPLEX 10.1.0 to implement the ILP on a computer with four Intel Xeon 2.40GHz CPUs and 4G of memory. The ILP scheme provides the optimal solution for static traffic demands. The simulations of SPPP and SFPP are implemented on a computer with a Intel 3.0GHz CPU and 1.5G of memory. We measure the performance of our schemes from following metrics:
• the protection redundancy: defined as the ratio of protection capacity to working capacity.
• the reject ratio: defined as the ratio of the number of requests rejected to the number of requests received.
• the number of wavelength channels: one wavelength channel is defined as a wavelength on some link. For example, A 3-hop path uses 3 wavelength channels.
• the number of XC: this metric denotes the number of optical cross connects that need to be reconfigured upon a double-link failure.
When studying the performance of SPPP and SFPP, we first consider the incremental traffic, that is, a demand never terminates once it is satisfied. In this traffic model, the capacity of the network link is set to infinity. Then we study the performance of these two schemes in dynamic traffic model.
In both traffic models, a set of randomly generated connection requests are loaded to the network. For each connection request, the working path is routed along the shortest path between the source and the destination. For dynamic traffic, the arrival of traffic follows Poisson distribution with λ connection requests per second and the duration of the request is exponentially distributed with a mean of 1/µ. The traffic load measured in erlangs is λ/µ.
ILP Results for Static Traffic
A small test network with 6 nodes and 11 edges (shown in Fig. 6 ) is used to test our ILP scheme. Table 2 shows the protection redundancy and the running time of ILP for different number of connections. Each data point is the average of ten test cases. The table shows that as the number of connections increases from 1 to 5, the protection redundancy decreases from 592% to 302%. This is expected because pcycle sharing can be better exploited when more connections exist in the network. On the other hand, the running time increases exponentially as the number of connections increases. We also use the SFPP and SPPP under the same scenarios and 592% 448% 373% 306% 302% Protection Redundancy(SPPP): 618% 546% 544% 534% 515% Protection Redundancy(SFPP): 600% 561% 535% 498% 502% calculate their redundancy performance. As expected, and as shown in Table 2 , SFPP and SPPP are not as efficient as the ILP under static traffic because they deal with connection requests one by one and without considering the future incoming connection requests. When ILP is used to find the optimal protection strategy for static demands, there will be sufficient time between the planning and provisioning processes even the ILP has long run-time. Moreover, ILP can provide the baseline to evaluate the performance of heuristic algorithms.
Comparison of SPPP and SFPP
We conduct simulations to compare the performance of SPPP and SFPP under incremental traffic and dynamic traffic. Three networks, the SMALLNET network , the COST239 network (Fig. 7) and the DISTRIBUTED network (Fig. 8) [18] , which consists of 47 nodes and 98 links, are used in the simulations. In the first set of simulations, we consider incremental traffic. The total number of wavelength channels used by all the working paths and by all the p-cycles are recorded for each simulation run. In Fig. 9 , we show the performance of SPPP and SFPP under different traffic load in SMALLNET network. The results shows that SFPP uses less wavelength channels for protection than SPPP under all traffic loads. Specifically, SFPP achieves a 16.4%-18.3% reduction in wavelength usage over SPPP. The reason for SFPP to ourperform SPPP is that SFPP uses long p-cycles that have more straddling links so that higher protection efficiency can be achieved.
In Fig. 10 , we show the performance of SPPP and SFPP in COST239 network. Again, SFPP uses less wavelength channels for protection than SPPP under all traffic loads. Specifically, SFPP achieves a 21.5%-24.5% reduction in wavelength usage over SPPP. The improvement of SFPP over SPPP is bigger than that in SMALLNET network.
In Fig. 11 , we show the performance of SPPP and SFPP in DISTRIBUTED network. Again, SFPP uses less wavelength channels for protection than SPPP under all traffic loads. Specifically, SFPP achieves a 20.6%-24.2% reduction in wavelength usage over SPPP. We can also observe that the number of wavelength channels used is much higher than that used in SMALLNET and COST239 because DISTRIBUTED is larger. With the increase of wavelength channels used by the working path, the wavlength channels reserved by these p-Cycles will also increase. the number of connections increases, which is consistent with the ILP results. The redundancy of SFPP is much lower than that of SPPP. For SMALLNET, SFPP achieves 16.4%-18.3% reduction in redundancy over SPPP; For COST239, SFPP achieves 23.0% -24.5% reduction in redundancy over SPPP; For DISTRIBUTED, SFPP achieves 23% -24% reduction in redundancy over SPPP.
As shown in Table 3 , we also study the efficiency of p-Cycles constructed by SFPP and SPPP under incremental traffic in three different networks. The p-Cycle efficiency of p-Cycle pc i is defined as the ratio of working wavelength channels protected by pc i over the wavelength channels reserved on p-Cycle pc i . SFPP has better efficiency performance than SPPP because SFPP tends to use longer p-cycles that can protect more straddling links. Thus, each p-cycle has higher capacity efficiency in average and this also explains why SFPP has lower redundancy. In the second set of simulations, we consider dynamic traffic. Each simulation has 10 rounds and 5000 randomly generated connection requests are loaded to the network in each round and the average reject ratio is recorded. The capacity of the network link is set to 10 wavelengths.
In Fig 15, we compare the reject ratio of SFPP and SPPP under different traffic loads (in erlangs) in SMALLNET network. The results show that SFPP performs worse than SPPP when traffic load is low. This can be explained as follows. When the traffic load is low, there is not enough connections to fully utilize the protection capacity provided by the long p-cycles. We also observe that the long p-cycles can be fully utilized and they can provide more efficient protection than those p-cycles created by SPPP when the traffic load becomes high. According to our simulation, SFPP performs better than SPPP when traffic load is above 32 erlangs. However, the reject ratio is high and it is not practical.
In Fig 16, we compare the reject ratio of SFPP and SPPP under different traffic loads in COST239 network. Again, the results show that SFPP performs worse than SPPP under low traffic loads. Similarly, SFPP will perform better than SPPP when the traffic load is above 30 erlangs.
In Fig 17, we compare the reject ratio of SFPP and SPPP under different traffic loads in DISTRIBUTED network. Again, the results show that SPPP performs much better than SFPP under low traffic loads. Which also shows that our SPPP has good scalability performance. We also observe that the reject ratio is 0 in all of these three networks when there is no protection provided.
In Table 4 , we compare the average computation time for a single demand using SPPP and SFPP in two test networks. As the table shows, it only takes SPPP 1.55 milliseconds on average to compute the p-Cycles for a demand in SMALL-NET. Meanwhile, SPPP runs faster than SFPP in both networks which corresponds well with previous time complexity analysis. SFPP just needs 2.45 milliseconds to compute the p-Cycle in COST239. Thus, the proposed schemes are suitable for dynamic demands. Both algorithms need more run time in DISTRIBUTED, which is expected because the DISTRIBUTED network has much more edges and nodes. 
Comparison of SPPP and the Algorithms in [9]
We compare SPPP with the three approaches-Method I, Method II, and MADPAproposed in [9] as shown in Table 5 . The network topology used is the 20-node 32-link ARPANET network. Protection ratio is the percentage of double-link failures that can be protected. Protection redundancy is the ratio of the total protection capacity to the total working capacity. XC max and XC avg denote the worst-case and average number of optical cross connects that need to be configured upon a double-link failure. In [9] , the authors assume the working capacity reserved on each link is one unit such that the schemes proposed in the paper require fixed protection capacity on each link, which equals 200%. When a link fails, Methods I and II require that all nodes in the network are informed of the failure through signaling. However, this is not required for MADPA. SPPP can operate with or without signaling of the failure event. If, upon a link failure, the traffic on the link is sent on both p-cycles simultaneously, then signaling is not required. In this case, a total of 4 cross connections are needed to recover from any double-link failure because the two endnodes of each failed link need configure their cross connects to direct the traffic onto the p-cycles. On the other hand, if only one p-cycle is used to restore the traffic upon a link failure, then signaling of failure is required and a total of 6 cross connections are needed to recover from a double-link failure in the worst case.
The worst case occurs when the second failure affects the p-cycle used to protect the first failure. In this case, when the first link fails, both endnodes configure their cross connects to direct the traffic onto the first p-cycle for this link. When the second link fails, the endnodes of the link configure their cross connects to direct the traffic onto one of the two p-cycles that is not affected by the first link failure. After the endnodes of the first failed link learn that the second failure affects the p-cycle being used, they reconfigure their cross connects to direct the traffic onto the second p-cycle for this link. Thus, a total of 6 cross connections are needed.
The results in Table 5 show that while SPPP has higher protection redundancy than the other three methods, the number of cross connections required is much less. Since p-cycles are pre-configured, SPPP requires only the endnodes of the failed links to configure their cross connects. On the other hand, cross connects have to be configured by every node along the protection path in the other three methods. Thus, SPPP is much faster in restoration than the other methods. Basi-cally, SPPP trades off protection redundancy for restoration speed. Compared with the other methods, SPPP's gain in restoration speed is much larger than its loss in protection redundancy.
Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the problem of protecting connections against twolink failures. The basic idea is to protect each working link with two p-cycles with link-disjoint protection segments. We present an ILP model to compute the optimal set of p-cycles for protecting a set of static demands. The ILP can provide the optimal solution for static demands and provide a baseline for evaluating the performance of heuristic algorithms. Realizing that ILP is not suitable for online provisioning process, we also propose two protection schemes -SPPP and SFPP -for dynamic demands. The numerical results show that SFPP is more capacity efficient than SPPP under incremental traffic. Under dynamic traffic, SPPP has lower blocking than SFPP in most practical cases. In addition to the time complexity analysis, we run simulations to show that the average computation time for a single demand is at the milisecond-level. The time complexity analysis also shows the good scalability of our proposed SFPP and SPPP schemes. Compared with the algorithms proposed in [9] , SPPP trades off protection redundancy for fast restoration speed. In the future, we plan to develop heuristic algorithms to solve the static traffic provisioning problem and design more efficient algorithms for dynamic traffic in terms of running time and protection redundancy. We will also consider multiple-link failure protection.
